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I. INTRODUCTION
Years ago, life and death were as distinguishable as black and white.
Simple definitions sufficed: Death was pronounced when the heart and
lungs ceased to function.1 As medical technology became more complex
in its ability to save lives, so did the definition of life itself.
In 1968 the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee published guidelines for de-
termining whether someone had died. They suggested that a dead person
would: 1) be unresponsive to and unaware of external stimuli; 2) have
no spontaneous respiration; 3) lack reflexes of any sort; and 4) have a flat
electroencephalogram, or EEG.2 Even this definition became outdated.
In 1981 the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research suggested the adop-
tion of a definition of death formulated by the American Bar Association,
the American Medical Association, and others.3 This definition states that
a dead person is one who has either sustained (1) "irreversible cessation
of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of
all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem.
'4
Ohio's definition of death adopts the criterion suggested by the Presi-
dent's Commission.5 The difficulty with this definition, however, is that
* The author wishes to dedicate this Note, with grateful admiration, to the
memory of her father, Julius George Zekan, M.D.
I Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 6, 426 N.E.2d 809, 812
(1980), (citing Evans v. Halterman, 31 Ohio App. 175, 165 N.E. 869 (1928)).
2 1c GRAY'S ATTORNEY'S TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE § 29A.11 (3rd ed. 1980) [here-
inafter Gray's]; Note, A Hypothetical: Quinlan Under Ohio Law, 10 AKRON L.
REV. 145, 147 (1976).
3 PRESIDENTS COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAIN-
ING TREATMENT 9 (1983) [hereinafter DECIDING TO FOREGO].
4 Id. at 9-10, 10 n. 7.
5 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.30 (Baldwin 1987) reads in pertinent part:
An individual is dead if he has sustained either irreversible ces-
sation of circulatory and respiratory functions or irreversible cessation
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it does not account for people like Karen Quinlan and Nancy Cruzan who,
although not dead by any definition, are on the blurry boundary between
life and death. Unaccounted for in this definition of death are those who
suffer such severe brain damage that they are irreversibly doomed to a
non-cognitive life, artificially sustained by mechanical support of their
vital biological functions.
In the past, those who are now resuscitated with modern technological
procedures such as electrical impulses to the heart, artificial respirators,
and nutrition and hydration apparatus, would have simply died.6 While
medical technological advances in aggressive life support systems should
be heralded as a tribute to man's triumph over death (particularly in
cases where the individual can return to a cognitive lifestyle), these ad-
vances should not force each person to hang on to his life indefinitely,
just because technology now permits him to do so. Many feel alienated
and frightened by apparatus that simply prolongs their dying process.7
By 1977 greater than 70% of the nation's population died in institutions
such as hospitals, nursing homes, or other long-term care institutions.
This number had been increasing over the decades and is now estimated
to be over 80%.s Many never regain cognition. Recent count indicates
that 10,000 Americans now remain, for whatever reason, in an incurable
and persistent vegetative condition,9 trapped in a state of life made pos-
sible by aggressive life support systems.
A dilemma exists: How do these non-cognitive individuals fit into the
legal definitions of life and death? What rights do they, their guardians,
of all functions of the brain, including the brain stem, as determined
in accordance with accepted medical standards. If the respiratory and
circulatory functions of a person are being artificially sustained, under
accepted medical standards a determination that death has occurred
is made by a physician by observing and conducting a test to determine
that the irreversible cessation of all functions of the brain has oc-
curred.
6 In tracing the historical definitions of death, one sees the expectancy that
one would no longer be considered alive after respiration ceased. Leach v. Akron
Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980). Envision an old
Western movie. The hero has just breathed his last breath, cradled in the arms
of his best cow-buddy. The hero is dead. Or is he? Enter the resuscitators: electrical
stimulators, artificial breathing apparatus and tubings of all sorts. Finally, they
are successful in recirculating oxygen into the hero's body - perhaps after 10
minutes - and thereafter maintaining his vital biological functions. Hurray! The
hero "lives" another 27 years in ignominy, oblivion, and unconsciousness, having
suffered irreversible brain damage as a result of oxygen deprivation. Is this really
triumph over death? BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY simply and ambiguously defines
death as "[t]he cessation of life; permanent cessations of all vital functions and
signs." Id. at 360 (5th ed. 1979).
1 DECIDING TO FOREGO, supra note 3, at 18-19; THE HASTINGS CENTER, GUIDE-
LINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF THE
DYING 65 (1987).
8 DECIDING TO FOREGO, supra note 3, at 17-18.
9 Gest, Changing the rules on dying, 109 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 22 (July
9, 1990).
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or others have in decisions concerning artificial life support, including
nutrition and hydration? To resolve the dilemma, a policy based on sound
reasoning needs to be established in Ohio to determine if and when the
termination of life support, including nutrition and hydration, can occur.
10
Recently, Ohio has had two chances to formulate a policy concerning
the withdrawal or refusal of artificial means of administering food and
water. First, in September, 1989, the Ohio legislature enacted a statute,
the Durable Power of Attorney for Health,1' which permits a competent
Ohio adult to grant the power to another designated competent adult to
make certain health care decisions for them in the event of their later
incompetency. 2 This statute details when an attorney in fact may refuse
or withdraw nutrition and hydration from the incompetent who had com-
pleted the DPAH document.'- The statute also indicates what common-
law rights remain in a guardian who may or may not be the attorney in
fact, independent of the additional powers granted by the statute.
14
Second, in August, 1989, the Montgomery County Court of Appeals in
Couture v. Couture," interpreted the Durable Power of Attorney for
Health statute (DPAH) as forbidding the withdrawal or refusal of arti-
ficial means of nutrition and hydration where death was not imminent,
notwithstanding the consent of the individual. 16 For that reason, the
Couture court refused to grant permission to remove the nasogastric tub-
ing from a young man who had lapsed into a persistent vegetative state
as a result of his medication (a risk known to the patient). The court
refused to grant permission even though it accepted the finding that Mr.
Couture's expressions that he not be maintained by any artificial life
support in the event of this precise occurrence were sufficient to "support
the substituted judgment of the guardian."'
7
The reasoning in the Couture decision is questionable. The policy ex-
pressed by the court based on their interpretation of the DPAH is not
supported by either an analysis of statutory language or legislative intent,
according to Senator Richard Pfeiffer, the sponsor of the DPAH legisla-
tion. "'8 In addition, the Couture court's assertion that consent is an un-
important factor in the decision whether or not to withdraw nutrition
10 Without a clear understanding of policy, abusive procedures may filter into
clinical practice relating to the withholding of nutrition and hydration. Caregivers
may become careless or arbitrary. Callahan, Public Policy and the Cessation of
Nutrition, By No EXTRAORDINARY MEANS 63 (1986).
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1337.11-1337.17 (Baldwin 1989).
12 Id.
13 Id. § 1337.13.
"Id. § 1337.13(A)(2).
"Couture v. Couture, 48 Ohio App. 3d 208, 549 N.E.2d 571 (1989).
16 Id. at 213, 549 N.E.2d at 576.
17 Id. at 214, 549 N.E.2d at 576.
1" Telephone interview with Senator Richard Pfeiffer, chief sponsor of Senate
Bill 13 which became the Durable Power of Attorney for Health (Jan. 11, 1990)
[hereinafter Sen. Pfeiffer] (conversation during which he said that he would have
written an Amicus Brief that would have stressed, among other things, that
guardians' powers were not affected by the statute.)
1990]
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and hydration is highly questionable in light of Cruzan v. Director, Mis-
souri Department of Health.19 In Cruzan, the Court recognizes the im-
portance of the common-law doctrine of informed consent, 0 assumes the
existence of constitutional rights permitting consent to withdraw from
artificial life support mechanisms," and leaves the question of how to
enforce such rights in the hands of the states. 22 Therefore, given the
suspect logic, reasoning, and statutory interpretation of the Couture court,
it seems unlikely that the decision will stand the test of time as a coherent
expression of Ohio's policy concerning the refusal or withdrawal of nu-
trition and hydration.
To formulate a soundly reasoned policy, Ohio needs to reexamine its
own common law, case law from sister states, and the Durable Power of
Attorney for Health statute. In order to clarify existing patient and guard-
ian rights, the formulated policy must determine in particular whether
or not to consider nutrition and hydration mechanisms in the same light
as other life support systems.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON LAW
A. Treatment of Competents
Competent individuals have decision-making powers that incompe-
tents, because they are impaired by a disability, lack. Competent indi-
viduals are able to voice their own decisions concerning medical care. In
emergency situations, under the doctrine of implied consent, a physician
is permitted to begin procedures, including life support systems, neces-
sary to save a person's life. This is because there is a presumption that
the individual, if able to express his wishes, would want to live. 3 Any
such presumption regarding a choice of medical treatment can be rebutted
effectively by a competent person.' 4 The right to make one's own medical
decisions, even if unreasonable in the eyes of others, 5 stems from the
right of self-determination and individual autonomy.26 Consent is the
exercise of this right of self-determination. Furthermore, consent must
be informed to be valid.27
19 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
20 Id. at 2846-47.
21Id. at 2851-52.
22 Id.
- Therefore, impliedly, a person would consent to a violation of his bodilyintegrity to preserve his own life. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
117 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON].
Surrogate decision makers are unable to assume some risks for the inca-pacitated that he could have assumed for himself if he were competent. Id. at
115.
25 Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978) (where apatient's medically irrational choice not to amputate to save her own life was not
sufficient to establish incompetency).
26 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2847-49 (1990);Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 430, 497 N.E.2d 626, 633(1986) (where wife was able to have a gastrostomy tube removed from her husband
who was in a persistent vegetative state); See also PROSSER AND KEETON, supra
note 23, at 866-67.
27 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 23, at 867-68.
[Vol. 38:279
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol38/iss1/17
NUTRITION AND HYDRATION
Congrove v. Holmes,28 an Ohio case, postulated that informed consent
imposed a duty on a physician to inform his patient about probable con-
sequences and risks, and the anticipated benefits of a suggested medical
procedure.2 9 Informing a patient in advance of treatment enabled that
patient to weigh the potential risks and benefits of the treatments as well
as other available alternatives. The patient could then make an informed
decision either consenting to or refusing the suggested procedure or treat-
ment. Such consent was important according to the Congrove court be-
cause "[elvery individual has a right to the inviolability of his person
which forbids a surgeon or a physician to invade the bodily integrity of
his person.""°
A later Ohio case, In re Milton,31 determined that the right to inviol-
ability of bodily integrity extended to situations where the physician
believed that treatment was necessary to save the life of the patient.
3 2
In Milton, a patient was permitted to refuse potentially life-saving
radiation treatments, transfusions and surgery.3 3 Although she was a
psychiatric hospital patient, she was considered competent to make in-
formed health care decisions. This was based on the fact that she had
never been adjudicated an incompetent, and because the hospital had
accepted her informed consent in making prior health care decisions.
3 4
The courts in both Congrove-1 and Miltons6 accepted a competent's right
to refuse life-sustaining medical treatments founded on the right of self-
determination and expressed in the doctrine of informed consent.37 An-
, Congrove v. Holmes, 37 Ohio Misc. 95, 308 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1973) (where
it was a jury question whether a lack of warnings about the risks involved in a
bilateral thyroidectomy constituted a lack of informed consent).
Id.; See also Nickell v. Gonzalez, 17 Ohio St. 3d 136, 139, 477 N.E.2d 1145,
1148 (1985) (where lack of informed consent is established when: 1) inherent risks
are not disclosed; 2) unrevealed risks are the proximate cause of the injury; and
3) a reasonable person, cognizant of the risks, would not consent); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2317.54 (Baldwin Supp. 1983) (where, in order to satisfy informed consent,
a document must include, in pertinent part: the nature, purposes, and risks of
the procedure; and the signature of the person or his legal guardian. Arguably,
the code does not prohibit advance directives for any medical procedure providing
there is sufficient showing of informed consent).
'0 Congrove, 37 Ohio Misc. 95, 102,308 N.E.2d 765, 769 (1973) (quoting McCord,
A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 MINN. L. REV.
381,392.
31 In re Milton, 29 Ohio St. 3d 20, 505 N.E.2d 255 (1987).
32 Id. at 21, 23, 505 N.E.2d at 256, 258 (where patient's belief in faith healing
as an exercise of her freedom of religion rights under the First Amendment and
the Ohio Constitution was accepted as a reason for refusal of medical treatment
even though the physician felt her decision was unsound from a medical stand-
point). See also Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978)
(where patient's refusal to amputate was life-threatening).
Milton, 29 Ohio St.3d at 21, 505 N.E.2d at 256.
34 Id. at 21-22, 505 N.E.2d at 256.
35 Congrove v. Holmes, 37 Ohio Misc. 95, 308 N.E.2d 765.
36 Milton, 29 Ohio St.3d 20, 505 N.E.2d 255.
37 Id.; Congrove, 37 Ohio Misc. 95, 308 N.E.2d 765 (1973). Accord Brophy v.
New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986). See also Mit-
tleman, The Right to Decide: Waiting for Cruzan, 64 LAw & FACT 26 (1990).
1990]
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other Ohio case, Bruni v. Tatsumi,3 8 explained that informed consent of
the patient could be satisfied by information addressed to the spouse or
parents.3 9 This is significant because it validates family participation in
the decision-making process. In addition, O'Brien v. Angley40 held that
informed consent was possible even when some information was omitted
because of remoteness. 41
Jurisdictions outside Ohio have recognized the right of a competent
person to have life-support systems removed. In Georgia v. McAfee, 42 the
court found that a competent quadriplegic had the right to disconnect his
ventilator even though his condition was not terminal. The McAfee court
ruled on the basis of informed consent, stating that McAfee was fully
aware of the consequences of his decision. 43 In recognizing a competent
person's right to accept, refuse, or withdraw life-supporting medical pro-
cedures, the McAfee court applied the reasoning of In re Farrell,44 which
stipulated that court approval of the disconnection of life-support systems
was unnecessary when the patient was competent, and when he had been
informed of his prognosis, the risks of withdrawing life-support, and of
alternative treatments.4 5
Although the Ohio cases do not record an instance where a competent
person has been held to have a right to refuse artificial nutrition and
hydration, at least one jurisdiction outside Ohio has spoken directly to
this issue. In the California case of Bouvia v. Superior Court,4 the court
recognized the right of self-determination in permitting a twenty-six year
old quadriplegic of sound mental faculties to refuse artificial nutrition
and hydration. She had understood the risks and consequences of her
actions and had made an informed decision. Influencing the court was
the fact that she was unable to fully feed herself due to her cerebral
palsy.47 The court noted that she need not consent to procedures that she
found burdensome and invasive.4
-1 Bruni v. Tatsumi, 46 Ohio St. 2d 127, 346 N.E.2d 673 (1976).
39 Id. at 137, 346 N.E.2d at 680. Although the elements of informed consent
were satisfied, in this case it was a jury question whether the plaintiff had given
consent to the higher risks of the specific operation performed on her. There was
a lesser-risked, medically preferred alternative that her physician could have
selected. Id.
40 O'Brien v. Angley, 63 Ohio St.2d 159, 407 N.E.2d 490 (1980).
41 Id., (where incomplete disclosure of all possible side effects of a medical
treatment did not necessarily negate informed consent). Accord Couture v. Cou-
ture, 48 Ohio App.3d 208, 549 N.E.2d 571 (1989), where "[i]t is not necessary
that evidence show exactly what the ward would do in the precise circumstances
at hand. Application of such a standard would impose impossible burdens as it
could almost never be shown that the precise circumstances were anticipated."
Id. at 214, 549 N.E.2d at 576.
42 Georgia v. McAfee, 259 Ga. 579, 385 S.E.2d 651 (1989).
43Id. Accord In re Estate of Longeway, 123 Ill. 2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292 (1989).
"In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987).
4Id.
Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986).
47 Id.; Comment, Elizabeth Bouvia v. Riverside Hospital: Suicide, Euthanasia,
Murder: the Line Blurs, 15 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 407, 407 n. 2 (1985).
"I Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986).
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In general, a competent individual's right to refuse or accept medical
interventions has been widely accepted even if these procedures are con-
sidered life-sustaining, as long as consent or refusal is informed. 49 The
Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health °
recognized that "the common-law doctrine of informed consent ... gen-
erally encompass[es] the right of a competent individual to refuse medical
treatment"51 and "assume[s] that the United States Constitution would
grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse
lifesaving hydration and nutrition"52 based on a Fourteenth Amendment
liberty interest.53 Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, takes an
even stronger stand: "[A] duty [to give effect to the decisions of a surrogate
decisionmaker] may well be constitutionally required to protect the pa-
tient's liberty interest in refusing medical treatment.
54
The right of self determination is not absolute, however, and must be
weighed against any state interests.55 Traditionally, courts have refused
to permit a patient to give informed refusal to a life saving treatment
when the patient was curable and was a parent of a minor child, because
the state had an interest in protecting the child from abandonment.
56
This notion has recently been challenged by the decision in Fosmire v.
Nicoleau5 7 where the court determined that a mother of an infant was
permitted to refuse blood transfusions notwithstanding the state's inter-
est in protecting the welfare of the child via the survival of its mother.
The court held that the right to refuse treatment was the same in a parent
or non-parent and that such right could not be undermined by claims of
child abandonment.
58
49 Kapp, Ohio's New Durable Power of Attorney, 14 U. DAYTON L. REv. 541,
541 (1989) [hereinafter Kapp].
50 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
1, Id. at 2851.
51 Id. at 2852. The right to choose or refuse medical treatments can be derived
from three sources: statutes, the common law, and the Constitution. Rights de-
rived from each of these must be balanced with a state's four compelling interests.
In order to properly weigh both sides, standards are needed. Adamson, The Right
to Refuse Life Sustaining Medical Treatment and the Noncompetent Nonterminally
Ill Patient: An Analysis of Abridgement and Anarchy, 17 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 461,
467, 473-75, 492 (1990). Perhaps the Cruzan Court was unwilling to wholeheart-
edly accept a constitutional right to die because it did not wish to undertake the
formidable task of setting universal standards by which the right could be ex-
ercized. Since such an important issue needs consensus to properly work, the
Court threw back the standard-setting questions to the states, the proper con-
sensus-setting arenas. Mayo, Constitutionalizing the "Right to Die," 49 MD. L.
REV. 103 (1990).
53 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. at 2851-52.
51 Id. at 2857.
- Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980).
The Fourteenth Amentment liberty rights must also be weighed against the
state's interests. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851-52 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457
U.S. 307, 321 (1982)).
PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 28, at 116.
5, Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 75 N.Y.2d 218, 551 N.E.2d 77, 551 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1990).
51 Id. at 230-31, 551 N.E.2d at 83-84, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 882-83. This holding is
contrary to past determinations in blood transfusion cases. Querry whether the
court was influenced by the fact that her refusal of the transfusions was motivated
1990]
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B. Treatment of Incompetents
An incompetent is defined by Ohio statute as "any person who is so
mentally disabled as a result of mental or physical illness, or chronic
substance abuse that he is incapable of taking proper care of himself or
his property .. . ."9 The issue of incompetency is customarily raised by
family members or health care personnel and is generally resolved outside
of court 0 even though the legal procedure is under the jurisdiction of the
Probate Court.6 1 When it has been determined that a person is incom-
petent, the court may intervene on the incompetent's behalf, exercising
its parens patriae2 power over the individual. In exercising its role as
guardian over persons who are under a legal disability, the court defends
the interests, including health and medical, of the incompetent that he
is unable to defend for himself. 63
In the absence of court intervention, a physician will generally rely on
the informed consent of the next-of-kin in making health care decisions
for the incompetent." When the court becomes involved,6 in general, the
preferred guardian is a relative - even a distant one. However, because
the court is primarily interested in selecting a guardian who would be
most likely to represent the best interests of the incompetent, it has
sometimes selected close friends or distant relatives over close relatives. 66
In Ohio, the court may appoint the spouse as a guardian,6 7 or, when the
incompetent has no acceptable guardian (for example, where there may
not only by religious reasons, but by concerns of contracting AIDS or another
communicable disease. Id. Perhaps it was this second reason that swung the
balance in favor of preserving the mother's rights of inviolability over the state's
interest in protecting the life of the child.
5' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.01(D) (Baldwin 1989).
60 DECIDING TO FOREGO, supra note 3, at 125.
6' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2101.24(A)(6) (Baldwin 1987) stipulates that the
Probate Court "make[s] inquests respecting persons who are unable to manage
their ... affairs effectively for reasons such as mental illness, mental deficiency,
or physical illness or disability, subject to guardianship .. "
62 Parens patriae is the "role of state as sovereign and guardian of persons
under legal disability ... to protect ... interests such as health ...." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979).
6 1 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS
185 (1982) [hereinafter 1 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION]; T. BEAUCHAMP AND J. CHIL.
DRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 138 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter T. BEAU.
CHAMP AND J. CHILDRESS]; DECIDING TO FOREGO, supra note 3, at 124-5 n. 11. This
interpretation of the parens patriae power over incompetents is what is applied
to once-competent incompetents who have not made directives for their future
health care nor made their wishes known by others.
DECIDING TO FOREGO, supra note 3, at 125; 298 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 508,508
(1978); Judges as Physicians, 14 U. CIN L. REV. 161, 179 (1940); Kapp supra note
49, at 543.
Appointment or removal of guardians is within the jurisdiction of the Probate
Court. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2101.24(A)(4) (Baldwin 1983).
1 DECIDING TO FOREGO, supra note 3, 126-27 n. 18-19 & accompanying text.
67 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.11 (Anderson 1976).
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be an adverse interest in the proceedings), the court may appoint another
guardian or guardian ad litem.6 8
Treatment of incompetent persons, where their wishes are unknown,
questionable, or unascertainable, favors prolonging life. This is based on
the concept that life itself, no matter what kind it is, is in the "best
interest" of the person. 69 In the medical profession, case studies have
shown that when the attending physician believed that cardio pulmonary
resuscitation (CPR) was beneficial to the patient or CPR's benefits were
unclear, the incompetent patient was resuscitated regardless of the sur-
rogate decision-maker's preference for, neutrality to, or opposition to the
CPR.70 Even when CPR was deemed not beneficial to the patient in the
eyes of the physician, CPR was applied unless the surrogate decision-
maker opposed such treatment. 71 This indicates a presumption in clinical
practice that the incompetent would favor receiving life-preserving treat-
ments.
Case law such as Ross v. Hilltop Rehabilitation Hospita 2 also suggests
a presumption favoring life where the wishes of an incompetent could
not sufficiently be ascertained. In Ross, although the patient himself
articulated a wish to remove his gastrostomy tube, the court would not
consider those expressions because it considered that he lacked the ca-
pacity to give informed consent. 73 Absent consent to remove lifesaving
equipment, the state's counter-balancing interests in preserving life and
preventing suicide are paramount. Thus, a presumption favoring life can-
not be overcome and the patient must remain on life-support.
In another case, In re Storer,"' the mother of an incompetent adult was
- OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.23 (Anderson Supp. 1988).6 9 T. BEAUCHAMP AND J. CHILDRESS, supra note 63, at 143.
70 DECIDING To FOREGO, supra note 3, at 247. This was in contrast to treatment
of competent patients. CPR was applied only when the patient favored or was
neutral to resuscitation, even if the physician felt that it would be beneficial to
the patient. When the patient opposed CPR, the treatment was not administered
regardless of the physician's assesment of its benefits. Id. at 244.
71 Id. This differs from CPR application to competent patients where CPR was
not deemed beneficial by the physician. In such situations, CPR was only applied
when the patient favored such treatment - not when he was neutral or opposed.
Id. Therefore, there was a strong presumption favoring life for incompetent in-
dividuals whose wishes were unknown whereas no such presumption existed in
competent individuals.
71 Ross v. Hilltop Rehabilitation Hosp., 676 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Colo. 1987).
73 Id. at 1542 (The patient may have been suffering from a mental illness and
depression, had been addicted to drugs, and was undergoing severe stress due to
his impending divorce and deportation proceedings. These circumstances may
have been unduly affecting the patient such that he was unable to formulate any
decision concerning his gastrostomy tube.). This case provides an example of the
difficulty that may arise in defining competency. Dean Smith suggests that this
will be a significant problem in the future. S. Smith, Alternative Decision Making
for the Elderly: Durable, Springing and Health Care Powers of Attorney and Living
Wills 18 (April 1990) (unpublished manuscript given as address for the Elder
Law Continuing Legal Education Seminar). An explanation of current compe-
tency testing and testing proposals are discussed in Note, Determining Patient
Competency in Treatment Refusal Cases, 24 GA. L. REV. 733, 744-50 (1990).
74 In re Storer, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied,
454 U.S. 858 (1981).
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not permitted to exercise a substituted judgment for her son to discontinue
the use of life-prolonging blood transfusions. This was because the court
was unable to ascertain what her son, who had a mental age of eighteen
months, would have wanted if competent. Without evidence that he would
wish to discontinue life supporting blood transfusions, it was presumed
that he would want to live, though his life expectancy even with trans-
fusions was very short. The court determined that it was in his best
interest to continue the transfusions. 75
C. Treatment of Once Competent Incompetents
1. Focus on the persistent vegetative state
This Note focuses on persons who are incompetent as a result of some
trauma which has necessitated connection to a life support system76 and
left them in a persistent vegetative state7 7 with a corresponding low level
of brain function.
A person in a persistent vegetative state is one who has "the capacity
to maintain the vegetative parts of neurological function but who.., no
longer has any cognitive function.."7 8 Those in a persistent vegetative
state, or pseudocoma, 7' do not become conscious or responsive to the en-
vironment because, in some cases, the upper portion of the brain has been
disconnected from the lower portion of the brain and nervous system.8 0
75 Id.
76 There is widespread agreement among cases to permit the termination of
life support in situations where the incompetent became severely and irreversibly
brain damaged. See infra section on case law. If less severely damaged individuals
were included in this discussion, the focus would shift from whether such ter-
mination is permitted at all, which is the issue here, to where to place the bound-
aries.
71 This is separate from a coma. Coma is defined as a "loss of consciousness."(GRAY, supra note 2, § 29A.20). Associated with awareness, consciousness is con-
sidered by some to be a necessary ingredient of life itself. Deep irreversible coma
is an important determinative of brain death. Id.
71 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 24, 355 A.2d 647, 654 (1976) (quoting Dr. Fred
Plum). Cruzan also relied on Dr. Plum's expertise in its explanative definition of
the persistent vegetative state. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S.
Ct. 2841, 2845 n.1 (1990).
79 Also known as "akinetic mutism, apallic syndrome, prolonged coma, coma
vigile, parasomnia and locked-in syndrome." GRAY, supra note 2, at § 29A.70.
m Id. The brainstem, or lower portion of the brain, is responsible for controlling
vegetative functions such as swallowing. Higher brain functions are probably the
result of the interaction between the upper portion of the brain and the brainstem.
PRESIDENTS COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH 15 (1981) [hereinafter
DEFINING DEATH]. Others are not sure of our assesment concerning brain func-
tions. They leave open the possibility that a person in this condition, although
unable to respond to his environment, may still have a sense of self-awareness.
P. RAMSEY, ETHICS AT THE EDGES OF LIFE 220-24 (1980).
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Depending on the precise location of the disconnection, the person may
retain some functions such as respiration.81
A persistent vegetative state can also be the result of anoxia. Anoxia
is a condition where the oxygen supply has been cut off, such as when
respiration ceases or the heart stops pumping blood through the lungs
and to the brain.8 2 Although brain stem cells can survive 15-20 minutes
without oxygen,8 3 the brain's cerebral cortex cells (associated with think-
ing and reasoning 4 ) can survive only a very short time.8 5 Even though
a person is resuscitated after durational anoxia has occurred, nerve cells
within the brain, particularly in the cerebral cortex, have already died.
Once dead, cells can never recover. Therefore, permanent brain damage
results.8 6
This Note is particularly concerned with victims of durational anoxia.
It is these individuals who have no chance of recovery to a cognitive life
and, consequently, have no place among the living or the dead.
7 They
have no cognition, no awareness, no willful actions, no sense of pain or
pleasure, but are not legally dead.8 8 These unfortunates have the greatest
need of relief.
Although there is no medical certainty concerning the life expectancy
of individuals in a persistent vegetative state, some can survive for a
relatively long time. Records reveal that survival of up to forty years is
possible. 9 Therefore, it is important to determine a policy concerning life
support systems which potentially may be used for a very long time.
81 GRAY, supra note 2, § 29A.70. The ability of respiration and other metabolic
functions decreases as the disconnection becomes lower and lower within the
brain. Accompanying the early stages of pseudocoma is an inadequate respiratory
function which would lead to death without a life support mechanism. However,
there may be some slight recovery after adjustment to the condition. This explains
why a person in a persistent vegetative state might eventually be weaned from
his respirator. Id.
82 GRAY, supra note 2, at § 206.30. The cessation of respiration alone may not
be sufficient to result in severe and permanent brain damage. As long as already
oxygenated blood continues to flow to the brain, full or partial recovery can take
place. However, circulaton without respiration cannot prolong survival for very
long since the blood becomes more and more oxygen-depleted each time tissues
draw out the oxygen from the blood. Id. at § 206.40.
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2868 n.8 (1990)
(Brennan, J. dissenting).
14 GRAY, supra note 2, at § 206.40 & see supra n. 80.
8- GRAY defines this time as only 1 minute without oxygen. Id., at § 206.30.
The Cruzan Court accepts a more generous 4-6 minutes for the destruction of
cerebral cells from oxygen deprivation. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2868 n.8 (Brennan,
J. dissenting).
6 GRAY, supra note 2, at § 206.40; DEFINING DEATH, supra note 80, at 17,18.
8, DECIDING To FOREGO, supra note 3, at 10; GRAY, supra note 2, at § 29A.00.
88 Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 426 n.20, 497 N.E.2d
626, 631 n.20 (1986).
s DEFINING DEATH, supra note 80, at 18.
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2. Case law
People who were once competent but have sunk hopelessly and irre-
versibly into a state of persistent vegetation have been permitted to au-
thorize the discontinuation of their life support mechanisms.9 0 The
seminal case in Ohio, Leach v. Akron General Medical Center,91 held that
the respirator could be disconnected in a case involving a seventy-year
old incompetent in a chronic vegetative state of very low brain activity.
No civil or criminal liability was attached to those participating in the
decision or the process of disconnection.92 The court based its decision
primarily on the constitutional right of privacy 93 which "guarantees to
an incurably, terminally ill person, who is in a permanent, vegetative
state, the right to decide future medical treatment.."94 A subsequent case,
Leach v. Shapiro,9' based its affirmation of the right of an incompetent
to refuse life saving procedures on the doctrine of informed consent. The
court stipulated that a patient had a right to refuse life saving treatments
when he could "satisfy the same standards of knowledge and understand-
ing required for informed consent. 9 6 Thus, a patient has the right in Ohio
to refuse life saving treatments when he can foresee the circumstances
which might place him in a state of persistent vegetation.9 7
As a case of first impression in Ohio, the Leach court relied on decisions
from other jurisdictions. The first state to decide the issue of whether
artificial life support could be disconnected from an incompetent person
was New Jersey. In the case In re Quinlan,98 the Supreme Court of New
Jersey extended the right of privacy first established by the United States
Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut's to a patient's ability to refuse
treatment. 100 A person's right to decline treatment must be balanced
E.g., Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (R.I. 1980) (withdrawal of nutrition/
hydration); In Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 245 Cal. Rptr.
840, cert. denied, - U.S.-, (1988) (withdrawal of nasogastric tube permitted
from 44-year-old man whose auto accident left him in a state of persistent veg-
etation); McConnell v. Beverly Enterprises-Connecticut, Inc., 209 Conn. 692, 553
A.2d 596 (1989) (withdrawal of nutrition/hydration); In re Estate of Longeway,
133 Ill. 2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292 (1989) (withdrawal of nutrition/hydration); In re
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976) (removal of respirator).
91 Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1,426 N.E.2d 809 (1980).
92 Id.
93 Although the Court in Cruzan questions whether the privacy right extends
to the refusal of medical care, it does not deny that a 14th Amendment liberty
interest would extend such constitutional protection. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept.
of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2852, 2857 (1990) (O'Connor, J. concurring).
"Leach, 68 Ohio Misc. at 12, 426 N.E.2d at 816. It is significant that the court
termed her prognosis of death in three to five years from her disease as terminal.
It was based on the use of terminal by the physician. This differs from the defi-
nition of "terminal condition" in the DPAH.
96 Leach v. Shapiro, 13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (1984).
96Id. at 397, 469 N.E.2d at 1053.
97/d.
8 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
9Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (where the constitutional right
of privacy, derived from the Bill of Rights, precludedjudicial intrusion in a couple's
choice regarding the use of contraception).
100 Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40. 355 A.2d at 663.
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against the state's interests, but at some point, an individual's rights
outweigh the state interests.'0' In Karen Quinlan's case, her inability to
emerge from a state of persistent vegetation to a "cognitive, sapient
state '10 2 was factually determinative in outweighing the state's interest
in preserving life. In the decision to permit the disconnection of her re-
spirator, the Quinlan court held that "the State's interest contra weakens
and the individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion
increases and the prognosis dims."'103 The court held that since a competent
person in similar circumstances could make a decision to withdraw from
artificial life support systems, even if death was a consequence, then an
incompetent person is also so entitled, if his wishes to do so are known.
04
To preserve Karen's interest against bodily invasion, the Quinlan court
used the substituted judgment of her parents. 10 5 The court was unable to
find a clear expression of Karen's wish to refuse life support in casual
conversation with her friend. However, the court noted that other
jurisdictions 0 6 had used the substituted judgment of surrogates in order
to implement medical decisions and authorize treatment for incompe-
tents. When a substituted judgment was found to be consistent with the
patient's desires, the state could determine that such decision by the
surrogate was in the best interests of the patient and therefore useful in
the exercise of the state's parens patriae responsibility toward the incom-
petent.10 7 The desires of the incompetent were to be decided on the basis
of whether or not the incompetent would view the medical procedures as
intrusive. 0 8 The importance of a substituted judgment and a pleading by
11d. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
112Id. at 55, 355 A.2d at 671.
,-- Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664. Although the Quinlan court couched the ability
to withdraw treatment in terms of invasiveness, other courts did not seem to use
the Quinlan balancing test. Other courts such as Brophy spoke in terms of what
the patient viewed as invasive. Thus, the focus on "objective" standards of invasive
treatment shifted to protecting a patient's decision-making values. Peters, The
State's Interest in the Preservation of Life: From Quinlan to Cruzan, 50 OHIO ST.
L.J. 891, 897-900 ((1989).
104 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663 (The Quinlan court relied on
the parents as surrogate decision-makers to determine Karen's wishes.).
105 For an excellent explanation of standards of decision-making, see Note,
Privacy, Family, and Medical Decision Making for Persistent Vegetative Patients,
11 CARDOZO L. REV. 713, 725-29 (1990).
106Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 44-46, 355 A.2d at 664-66 (citing Hart v. Brown, 29
Conn. Supp. 368, 369, 289 A.2d 386, 387-88 (1972)); Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d
145, 147-48 (Ky.1969).
107 Id. at 40-41, 355 A.2d at 663-64.
'll Id. (where Quinlan's respirator was considered an "extraordinary" means
of keeping her alive, and therefore could be disconnected. Id. at 31-33, 48, 335
A.2d at 658-60,668). The permission to terminate all "extraordinary" treatment
and the denial of permision to terminate all "ordinary" measures is confusing.
Some equate "extraordinary" with "not frequently done." Others say something
is "extraordinary" if it involves a technically advanced apparatus. DECIDING TO
FOREGO, supra note 3, at 84. A more reasonable approach, in accord with Catholic
teaching, is the proportionate/ disproportionate view on the medical intervention.
It is looked at from the point of view of the patient, weighing his burdens and
benefits. Prolonging his life is not always considered an automatic benefit. It is
examined in light of all the circumstances to determine what is in the patient's
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third parties on the incompetent's behalf was to preserve the incompe-
tent's rights of self-determination which otherwise would be lost.'0 9
Although the Cruzan Court does not adopt the theory that the right to
refuse medical treatments falls within the constitutional right of privacy,
it does not deny constitutional protection. Instead, the Court states that
"this issue is more properly analyzed in terms of a Fourteenth Amend-
ment liberty interest."110 The Court also concedes that the right to refuse
life support founded on a liberty interest "may be inferred from our prior
decisions.""'
In the case of In re Eichner,12 the common-law right of self-determi-
nation was determinative in holding that an eighty-three year old indi-
vidual in a persistent vegetative state was able to have his respirator
removed. The Eichner court reaffirmed that the rights of self-determi-
nation of an incompetent did not disappear when he became incompe-
tent:" 3 "[Bly standards of logic, morality and medicine the terminally ill
should be treated equally, whether competent or incompetent."" 4 The
Eichner court stipulated that refusal of medical treatment was valid un-
der circumstances where it would only prolong suffering needlessly, or
would "serve merely to denigrate his conception of the quality of life."'1
best interests. Id. at 84-89; See also T. BEAUCHAMP AND J. CHILDRESS, supra note
63, at 127, 136; Lynn and Childress, Must Patients Always be Given Food and
Water, By No EXTRAORDIANRY MEANS 50-55 (1986) [hereinafter Lynn and Chil-
dress]; Childress, When is it Morally Justifiable to Discontinue Medical Nutrition
and Hydration?, By No EXTRAORDINARY MEANS 69-71 (1986) [hereinafter Chil-
dress]; P. RAMSEY, supra note 80, at 153; Note, A Hypothetical: Quinlan Under
Ohio Law, 10 AKRON L. REV. 145, 150-53 (1976).
'09 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2852 (1990); Ei-
senstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 481 (1965); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976).
110 Cruzan, at 2851 n.7.
" Id. at 2851.
"'In re Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.Supp.2d 517 (1980).
113 Id. at 464, 426 N.Y. Supp. at _. Accord Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical
Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980); Superintendant of Belchertown
State School v Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E. 417 (1977) (where the right
of privacy and informed consent extends to incompetent persons in refusing life
support mechanisms); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 35 A.2d 647 (1976).
114 Eichner, 73 A.D.2d at 464, 426 N.Y.Supp.2d at 542.
1"1 Id. at 458-59, 426 N.Y. Supp.2d at 539. Accord Brophy v New England Sinai
Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986) (where decision to forego life support
was based on a competent's right of self-determination, and not an outsider's
viewpoint). This concept that quality of life is determined by an individual's
conception is superior to the Quinlan quality of life argument which was based
on definitions of extraordinary and ordinary care. See supra note 108. The de-
sirability of treatment ought to be founded on a personal feeling of bodily intrusion
rather than on someone else's fluctuating, external standard of ordinary or ex-
traordinary care. One must assume some kind of quality of life standard if burdens
and benefits are to be weighed in formulating a decision that is in the best interests
of the patient. T. BEAUCHAMP AND J. CHILDRESS, supra note 63, at 134. This
contrasts with the views of others who believe that by using some kind of quality
of life standard, even if based on a patient's presumed perspective, it will force
a "wedge" into the sanctity of life and permit the posibility of euthanasia. Note,
A Hypothetical: Quinlan Under Ohio Law, 10 AKRON L. REV. 145, 164 (1976).
Others are concerned that adopting any quality of life approach puts an unde-
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The Eichner court, like the Quinlan court, said that substituted judg-
ment was valid in determining what an incompetent would decide for
himself if competent. In Eichner, however, unlike Quinlan, the patient
had clearly expressed his desire not to be maintained on life support
systems should he fall into a persistent vegetative state.'
1 6
The Eichner situation bears resemblance to the Ohio case, Leach v.
Akron General Medical Center.11 7 The Leach court held that a respirator
could be disconnected from an incompetent woman who, when competent,
had clearly and convincingly expressed an intent to refuse life support.
The court examined testimony by seventeen witnesses concerning the
prognosis of irreversible brain damage and her desire not to be placed on
life support systems. At the time of the cardiac arrest and subsequent
connection to artificial life support, Mrs. Leach was already in a terminal
condition with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. She knew that she would
become incapacitated and die within three to five years.11 Conversations
just two days before her incapacity revealed her dread of being placed on
life support: "That's the one thing that terrifies me. I don't want to be
put on life support systems. I don't want to live if I have to be a vege-
table."11 9 This, the Leach court determined, was clear and convincing
evidence of the intent of Mrs. Leach not to consent to the use of artificial
life support. Therefore, it was sufficient to support the substituted judg-
ment of her family to disconnect her respirator.
1 20
When physicians or hospitals do not comply with a patient's refusal of
life support, the Ohio case of Estate of Leach v. Shapiro121 held that a
cause of action for battery exists.122 For competent patients, this cause of
action accrues immediately upon nonconsensual bodily invasion. With
incompetent individuals, however, there is a presumed consent akin to
the implied consent in emergency situations because, as in an emergency,
the incompetent's wishes are not immediately discernible. Therefore, it
is presumed that the individual would wish to save his own life."23 The
sirable focus on the benefit of lives rather than the benefit of treatments. T.
BEAUCHAMP AND J. CHILDRESS, supra note 63, at 134.
116Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.Supp.2d 517 (1980). Used as clear and
convincing evidence of Brother Fox's intent not to continue the use of the res-
pirator were his oral expressions that he "would not want any of this extraor-
dinary business ... to be done for him" when discussing the Quinlan case in
serious discussions. Id. at 440, 426 N.Y. Supp.2d at 526. In addition, Brother Fox
was in agreement with Pope Pius XII's allocutio which had been discussed in
conjunction with the Quinlan case. In the formal address before anesthesiologists,
the Pope stated that there was no obligatioin to treat patients beyond ordinary
care, that a resirator fell outside the ordinary care category, and that disconnec-
tion of the respirator was only an indirect cause of death. Id. at 439 n.3, 426 N.Y.
Supp.2d at 526.
117 Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1,426 N.E.2d 809 (1980).
I' Id.
119 Id. at 4, 426 N.E.2d at 811.
120 Id. at 12-13, 426 N.E.2d at 816.
121 Leach v. Shapiro, 13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (1984).
122 Id.
12' PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 23, at 117.
1990]
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1990
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
Shapiro court, however, warned against using the implied consent doc-
trine to continue lifesaving treatment where it would undermine the
incompetent's right to refuse such treatment. Where it could be shown
that an express refusal to consent to treatment existed, as in the Leach
case, "an implied agreement [could not] thereafter arise.... Thus, the
presumption in favor of the life-preserving procedure is effectively re-
butted when the express wishes of an incompetent clearly and convinc-
ingly establish that he would not desire such bodily intrusion. Therefore,
a cause of action for battery will exist if a physician and/or hospital
disregards the incompetent's desire to refuse treatment.
The intrusiveness of life support has been addressed by several courts.
According to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Brophy v.
New England Sinai Hospital, 125 intrusiveness should be examined in light
of each patient's personal viewpoint. The Brophy court determined that
"the law recognizes the individual's right to preserve his humanity, even
if to preserve his humanity means to allow the natural processes of a
disease or affliction to bring about a death with dignity."126 The court
maintained that it was not forcing anyone to accept a judgment based on
its own view on the value of life. 2 7 Instead, the court held that its duty
to preserve life encompassed a "recognition of an individual's right to
avoid circumstances in which the individual himself would feel that ef-
forts to sustain life demean or degrade his humanity.'1 28 Thus, it is not
the court, but the individual himself who determines what is personally
degrading. This degradation is measured by how intrusive the patient
feels the treatments are rather than by some external, inconsistent meas-
ure of what is considered extraordinary or ordinary care. 129 A New Jersey
Supreme Court case, In re Conroy,130 supports the idea that invasion of
one's bodily integrity should be determined by the individual and not the
state. The Conroy court determined that "the primary focus should be
the patient's desires and experiences of pain and enjoyment - not the
type of treatment involved."13' This reasoning, based on the rights of self-
determination 3 2 and informed consent, was applied to the removal of
nasogastric tubings. 133
,24 Shapiro, 13 Ohio App. 3d at 396, 469 N.E.2d at 1053.
125 Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986).
126 Id. at 434, 497 N.E.2d at 635; Accord Superintendant of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Conroy, 93 N.J.
321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). See also quality of life discussion supra note 115. This
contradicts the suggestion that a decision to terminate life support imposes an
outside view of the quality of life on a person making the decision for himself.
What is suggested only is that the person issuing the directive make his own
evaluation for himself.
"I Brophy, 398 Mass. at 434, 497 N.E.2d at 635.
128 Id.
- Id. See also supra note 108.30 93 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
Id. at 369, 486 A.2d at 1233.
For a general understanding of the right of self-determination, see Shaver,
Do Not Resuscitate: The Failure to Protect the Incompetent Patient's Right of Self-
Determination, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 218 (1989).
133 In re Conroy, 93 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985) (In this circumstance the
tubing was not removed because there was insufficient evidence of the patient's
intent.)
[Vol. 38:279
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol38/iss1/17
NUTRITION AND HYDRATION
Although the courts express a desire to base decisions concerning the
removal of nutrition/hydration devices on the patient's wishes, the ques-
tion still remains: What would the incompetent really want if he were
able to make an informed decision at the precise moment it were needed?
Consistent standards are needed to establish the degree of certainty that
courts require in determining what would be consistent with the incom-
petent's wishes if he could express them.
In Cruzan v. Harmon,'3' Nancy Cruzan was not permitted to have her
gastrostomy feeding and hydration tubing removed via her parent sur-
rogate decision-makers. The Missouri Supreme Court determined that a
clear and convincing evidentiary standard must be satisfied in order to
remove the life-sustaining tubing,135 and that in Nancy's case such an
evidentiary standard had not been met.136 The Supreme Court in Cruzan
v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,137 upheld the decision of the
Missouri Supreme Court. The five to four decision focused on the ability
of states to determine their own standards, and on Missouri's clear and
convincing burden of proof standard. The U.S. Supreme Court held that
a procedural safeguard such as a "clear and convincing" proof standard
was not unconstitutionally high because the "risk of an erroneous decision
•.. [should be borne by] ... those seeking to terminate an incompetent
individuals life-sustaining treatment.' 38
The Leach13 court, interpreting Ohio law, selected the clear and con-
vincing standard to support a substituted judgment for an incompetent
concerning the disconnection of a respirator. 140 It would appear that this
same standard would, in light of Cruzan, be appropriate for making de-
cisions to terminate nutrition and hydration providing that Ohio consid-
ers the administration of nutrition and hydration to those unable to ingest
in the same light as other life support systems.'
4
'
134 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988).
135 Id.
136 Id. at 417.
137 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
138 Id. at 2856.
139 Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1,426 N.E.2d 809 (1980).
140 Id.
141 Many jurisdictions accept nutrition/hydration as any life support care. E.g.,
Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); In
re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). It is so accepted by the American
Academy of Neurology and the American Medical Association. Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990) (Brennan, J. dissenting). Nevertheless
some argue that artificial nutrition and hydration ought to be treated differently
than respirators and other artificial mechanisms: that it is alway ordinary, and,
therefore, never optional. Note, Artificial Nutrition and the Terminally III: How
Should Washington Decide?, 61 WASH. L. REV. 419, 421 (1986). However, there
are others who believe that it more clearly resembles medical treatment; therefore
it should be medically decided. SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, THE PHYSICIAN
AND THE HOPELESSLY ILL PATIENT 12 (1984). Childress, a noted biomedical ethics
scholar, believes that it would be morally wrong to use life-sustaining treatment
on a once-competent incompetent against his wishes. BY No MEANS, supra note
108, at 77,78. See infra notes 150 - 60 & accompanying text; Kapp, supra n. 49,
at 553. There is still an argument that nutrition/ hydration devices should be
treated separately from a humanitarian viewpoint because prolonged pain would
1990]
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1990
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
In conclusion, the once-competent incompetent's rights are best ex-
plained by incorporating the right of self-determination found within the
common-law doctrine of informed consent which applies to competent
patients, with the parens patriae responsibility of the state toward its
incompetent wards. This merging can be accomplished by examining the
evidence to determine if the incompetent, prior to his incompetence, ex-
pressed a desire not to undergo life-sustaining treatment, and whether
the evidence of the incompetent's express directive satisfies the clear and
convincing standard set by Leach. If it does, then the patient should be
able to refuse or discontinue all life support via the substituted judgment
of his surrogate, absent a court's determination that compelling state
interests mandate continuing the life-sustaining treatments.
If, however, the once-competent incompetent gave no express directives
nor gave any clear or convincing expression of his intent, there would be
insufficient evidence to support the substituted judgment of a guardian
in making a decision to disconnect life support. The court would then
need to exercise its parens patriae responsibility over its ward's best
interests as though he had never been competent. In such a situation,
the presumption that the person would choose to live is irrebuttable
because there is no supportive evidence that he would choose not to pro-
long his life. The incompetent must remain on life support systems be-
cause the state's interest in preserving life is the sole determinative factor
in the court's decision. 142
occur. (Although pain occurs with the disconnection of a respirator, the time is
mercifully short.) However, when dealing exclusively with patients in a persistent
vegetative state, the pain argument is inapplicable. "Since the prevailing clinical
view is that patients in persistent vegetative states are incapable of sensory
perceptions, malnutrition and dehydration for such patients do not imply the pain
of hunger or thirst that persons normally experience." Kapp, supra note 49, at
556.
1
4 2 The principles of beneficence and autonomy require a presumption favoring
life. By No MEANS, supra note 108, at 77. See also PROSSER AND KEETON, supra
note 28, at 117. This may at some point be challenged by one of two arguments.
There is an argument that the state's interest in life cannot be so compelling
since the state does not require citizens to procure necessary medical care, nor
does it carry enough health insurance to support the medical assistance to all
those in need. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 108 S. Ct. 2841, 2870 n.15(1990) (Brennan, J. dissenting). Another argument can be viewed from a utili-
tarion approach. If life-sustaining machinery is required even in cases where the
intent of the incompetent was known, as the need for such technical equipment
increased, the money needed to sustain such activity may be taken from otherimportant health needs. At that point, the distribution of available wealth may
very well necessitate an approach which terminates life-sustaining machinery
on persistent vegetative patients, notwithstanding some of their wishes to be
sustained. For an allocation of resources analysis, see G. GRABER, A. BEASLEY,
AND J. EADDY, Chapter 5, Who Gets What? and Appendix I, MORE ABOUT ETHICAL1
THEORIES, ETHICAL ANALYSIS OF CLINICAL MEDICINE (1985).
Although this may be reprehensible for some, others will accept such deter-
mination as part of a double-effect philosophy. Under the doctrine of double-effect,
there is a distinction between results that are direct versus indirect consequences
of a person's actions. A person who takes pain medicine and subsequently dies
is viewed differently from a person who, under otherwise exact circumstances,
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3. State interests
The individual's rights of self-determination are not absolute, but
should be respected as long as the decision stemming from those rights
is not outweighed by one of four compelling state interests. The Leach
143
court identified these four significant state interests as: (1) the preser-
vation of life;'" (2) the prevention of suicide; (3) the maintenance of the
ethical integrity of the medical profession; and (4) the protection of third
parties.145 They must be balanced with the right of self-determination
expressed in any decision to forego artificial life support.
46
In Leach, the court determined that the state's interest in preserving
life was not compelling enough to outweigh an individual's autonomy
when an incompetent was incurably and terminally ill and in a persist-
ently vegetative state." 7 Other jurisdictions agreed that the state's in-
terest in preserving life was very high with curable illnesses and
relatively low with illnesses and injuries resulting in a permanent, in-
curable, vegetative state.14 The state's interest in the preservation of life
takes the precise dose for the purpose of killing himself and subsequently dies.
In the first example, death was an indirect consequence of the pain medication,
whereas in the second example, ingestion of the pain medication was a direct
cause of death. See Quinn, Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine
of Double Effect, 18 PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRs 334 (1989); Mayo, Consti-
tutionalizing the "Right to Die," 49 MD. L. REV. 103, 140-41 n. 203 (1990). The
termination of life support measures would be viewed not so much as the killing
of the persistent vegetative patient, but of providing expensive medical care
alternatively to individuals who are recoverable with treatment. In this light,
the death of the patient whose life-sustaining machines have been disconnected,
will be a sad, but indirect result.
'4 Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809
(1980).
'" The purposes behind a state's interest in life is four-fold: to protect a patient's
welfare, protect his wishes, enforce community beliefs about the sanctity of life,
and to steer clear of the slippery slope erosion. If one does not protect the sanctity
of all life, it is feared, in the slippery slope argument, that permitting withdrawal
of life-sustaining procedures in some cases will lead to the condoning of suicide.
Peters, The State's Interest in the Preservation of Life: From Quinlan to Cruzan,
50 OHIO ST. L.J. 891, 893, 962 (1989).
14'Leach, 68 Ohio Misc. 1,426 N.E.2d 809 (1980). Accord Severns v. Wilmington
Med. Center, 425 A.2d 156 (Del. Ch.1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417, (1977); In re Quinlan, 70
N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976) In re Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.Supp.2d 517
(1980); In re Colyer, 99 Wash.2d 114, 122-23, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (1983).
146 A-tihough the decision was ultimately expressed by a surrogate on the pa-
tient's behalf, it was upheld because such decision was clearly and convincingly
expressed by the patient herself at a time prior to her incompetency.
147 Leach, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980).
, E.g., Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 433, 497 N.E.2d
626, 635 (1986); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373
Mass 728, 742, 370 N.E.2d 417, 428 (1977).
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is not so compelling as to override a person's right to determine his own
medical treatment when there is evidence of his express desires.149
The question remains, however, whether a person's right to refuse treat-
ment overrides a state's interest in preserving life and preventing suicide
when nutrition/hydration life support is involved. Further, would the
withdrawal of nutrition and hydration be considered within the legal
definitions of killing or suicide?
Jurisdictions which have decided cases involving the termination of
nutrition and hydration of a patient have reasoned that the refusal or
withdrawal of nutrition and hydration was neither killing nor suicide
because such action was merely considered an intention not to prolong
life by artificial means.15 In Brophy,"1' the court determined that the
affliction that made swallowing impossible was the killing agent, not the
removal of feeding tubes. Death resulted from neither killing nor suicide,
but from natural causes, and was not intended by the patient. 152 In Con-
roy, 15 the appellate court agreed: "Refusing medical intervention merely
allows the disease to take its natural course; if death were eventually to
occur, it would be the result, primarily, of the underlying disease, and
not the result of a self-inflicted injury." 54
In Leach,'" disconnection of life support was not considered suicide
because "[sluicide requires a specific intent to die. Withdrawal of a res-
pirator evinces only an intent to forego extraordinary measures, and
allows the processes of nature to run their course.""56 Suicide was not
established because disconnecting the life support did not indicate an
intent to die. Nor was disconnection considered the proximate cause of
death. 15 Since the disconnection cannot be considered killing or suicide
by the reasoning above, the state's interest in these matters cannot be
compelling enough to override a person's consent to disconnect or refusal
to connect onto a life support system.
141 Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980).
The Cruzan Court supports a state's procedural safeguard of an incompetent
person's wishes concerning medical treatment. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of
Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2856 (1990).
150 See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985), (where rejecting na-
sogastric tube was not attempting suicide); Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal.
App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App.
3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986) (where her wish to die was interpreted to mean
that she was willing to accept death as a natural consequence of her unwillingness
to accept the burdensome invasion of constant care required by her disease).151 Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. at 417, 497 N.E.2d at 638.
152 Id.
153 In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
154 Id. at 350-51, 486 A.2d at 1224. Accord Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal.
App.3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App.
3d, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984); Brophy, 398 Mass. at 439, 497 N.E.2d at 638.
" Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1,426 N.E.2d 809 (1980).
156 Id. at 10, 426 N.E.2d at 815.
Is' In State v. Johnson, 56 Ohio St. 2d 35, 381 N.E.2d 637 (1978), the court
determined that cause of death was the trauma that eventually led to the con-
nection to life support in the first place.
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Many believe that the definition of life support should include the
artificial delivery of nutrition and hydration. 158 Jurisdictions outside of
Ohio, 59 as well as the American Academy of Neurology and the American
Medical Association consider artificial means of nutrition and hydration
as a form of medical treatment no different from respirators and other
types of life-sustaining medical care. 16° The legal ability of patients or
their surrogates to disconnect respirators from once-competent incom-
petent patients is well documented.' 6' When life support includes nutri-
tion and hydration along with respiration, its disconnection should not
be considered killing or suicide. Therefore, the state's interest in pre-
serving life or preventing suicide should not be compelling enough to
override a person's wish to refuse nutrition and hydration by artificial
means.
Another state interest, maintaining the integrity of the medical com-
munity, according to the Leach court, was deemed not to have been com-
promised when a respirator was disconnected from a patient who was in
an incurable and persistent vegetative state. 162 The integrity of the med-
ical community could not be compromised by the disconnection of artificial
nutrition and hydration if, as a whole, the community felt that termi-
nation was either appropriate or at least not contrary to their medical
ethics. The President's Commission has recommended that each health
care institution establish an in-house ethics committee to study and re-
solve ethical issues raised by requests to abstain from or terminate life-
sustaining treatments within their institutions. 163 Many, if not most, hos-
pitals already have a functional ethics committee. 6 4 In fact, an institu-
tional ethics committee was involved in the Quinlan decision as early as
1976.165 Although not required to do so, the committee could adopt the
standards of representative organizations of the health care community
such as the American Medical Society and the American Academy of
Neurology. Both organizations have declared that termination of artificial
nutrition and hydration is acceptable where the patient is in an irrever-
sible vegetative state.16
A professional's medical integrity, however, can be affronted in spite
of the philosophies of health care organizations. To avoid compromising
personal standards of medical integrity, the law should not force any
hospital or individual physician to carry out the wishes of the incompetent
to disconnect feeding tubes. To recognize both the values of the patient
desiring the cessation of artificial nutrition and hydration and the con-
flicting values of the health care professional or institution which, because
'58 E.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2857 (1990)
(O'Connor, J. concurring). See also Kapp, supra note 49, at 553.
119 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2867 n.7 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
Id. at 2867.
6 E.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); Leach v. Akron Gen.
Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980).
"2 Leach, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980).
6 DECIDING TO FOREGO, supra note 3, at 5.
'6 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 63, at 187.
16 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 54, 355 A.2d at 672.
11 Couture v. Couture, 48 Ohio App. 3d 208, 211, 549 N.E.2d 571, 574 (1989).
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of ethical considerations, cannotjustify the discontinuation of the patient's
nutrition and hydration, courts need to permit the qualifying person to
be moved to a hospital that will carry out his wishes, and/or transfer
health care of the patient to a physician who will comply with the patient's
desire to forego treatment. This is essentially what courts in other juris-
dictions have done. 167
Finally, the state's interest in protecting innocent third parties was
considered minimal in Leach since there were no minor children in-
volved. 168 Other states generally have not found third party interests
compelling. 169 Thus, the rights of the patient to discontinue or refuse
treatment prevailed over the combination of state interests.
Under Ohio's common law, state interests have not been deemed com-
pelling enough to outweigh the interests of the persistent vegetative
incompetent where there was clear and convincing evidence that the
person would choose not to prolong his life in such a condition. 170 Ohio
has a firm foundation in the common law to extend this outlook to cases
involving the termination or refusal of artificial nutrition and hydration,
as has been the case in other jurisdictions.171
III. ARTIFICIAL NUTRITION AND HYDRATION IN OHIO
A. Introduction
Under the common law in Ohio prior to the recently-enacted Durable
Power of Attorney for Health (DPAH) statute, a guardian was able to
167E.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App.3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297
(1986); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626,(1986); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
168 Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980).
It is difficult to imagine a situation where a third party's right to protection would
be greater than the incompetent's privacy right to determine his own medical
treatment when he is in a non-cognitive, irrecoverable condition. Perhaps it might
arise on the insurance level where companies construe policies in such a way as
to force a policy-owner in making a health care decision contrary to his deep-
seated personal views on whether disconnecting artificial life support is killing.
To avoid such catastrophy, it is imperitive that the legislature intervene. Health
insurance policies should be forbidden from imposing penalties on those who did
not wish to terminate artificial life support. In addition, life insurance companies
should not be permitted to withhold payment from beneficiaries of policy-holders
who chose to terminate life support and subsequently die. If the state determined
that such refusal or withdrawal was neither killing or suicide, the insurance
companies should not be allowed to withhold payment on those grounds. Thirty-
five of the thirty-nine states with living will legislation have provisions whereby
the living will document has no effect on health or life insurance. Note, Com-
parison of the Living Will Statutes of the Fifty States, 14 J. OF CONTEMP. LAW 105,
123-29 (1988).
"I E.g., In re Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292 (1989); Brophy
v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626, 638 (1986).
176 Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1,426 N.E.2d 809 (1980).
171 E.g., Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626
(1986); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); Bouvia v. Superior Court,
179 Cal. App.3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986).
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exercise a substituted judgment for the incompetent. 172 By this means,
medical treatment could be refused or withdrawn if there were clear and
convincing evidence of the incompetent's intent to prevent such bodily
intrusion. 173 Life support could be terminated after the courts determined
that state interests in preserving life, preventing suicide, preserving the
integrity of the medical profession, or protecting innocent third parties
were not sufficient to outweigh the incompetent's right of self-determi-
nation. 7
4
The common law permitting a guardian to plead to the court for the
disconnection of life support mechanisms on behalf of the once-competent
incompetent must now be reexamined in light of the DPAH. 175 Although
the recent decision in Couture76 expressed the opinion that the common
law regarding the disconnection of life support has been superseded by
the DPAH,177 an interpretation of the statute in light of its plain language
and legislative intent strongly suggests that the common law rules re-
main intact.17 Contrary to the Couture opinion, guardians have not been
limited by the statute in the making of health care decisions for the
principal. 79 What has been changed by the statute is that now attorneys
in fact selected under the statutory provision, as well as guardians, have
an ability to make health care decisions for the principal in most circum-
stances.180
B. The Durable Power of Attorney for Health
The DPAH' 18 enables a competent adult to execute a document naming
another person of his choice that he has freely selected as his attorney
in fact.8 2 This attorney in fact'8 3 is permitted to make decisions for the
172 Leach, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809.
173 Id.; In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231 (1985).
174Leach, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809.
175 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1337.11 - 1337.17 (Baldwin Supp. 1989).
176 Couture v. Couture, 48 Ohio App. 3d 208, 549 N.E.2d 571 (1989).
177 Id. at 213, 549 N.E.2d at 575-76.
178 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.13(A)(2) (Baldwin Supp. 1989) reads, in per-
tinent part: "This section does not affect... any right that the person designated
as attorney in fact... may have, apart from the instrument, to make or participate
in the making of health care decisions on behalf of the principal."
179Telephone interview with Senator Richard Pfeiffer, Chief sponsor of Senate
Bill 13 which became the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Act (Jan. 11,
1990). Sen. Pfeiffer, supra note 18.
18O The OHIo REV. CODE ANN. excepts decisions refusing or withdrawing comfort
care (§ 1337.13(C) ) or life support, unless the principal is in a statutorily defined
terminal condition (§ 1337.13(B)).
I'l OHIO REV- CODE ANN. §§ 1337.11 - 1337.17 (Baldwin Supp. 1989). For a
comparison with the prior durable power statute, formal guardianship and living
trusts, see Fabens, Ohio's Durable Power of Attorney, 2 OHIo LAWYER 9 (1988).
182 There are limitations against selecting medical personnel indirectly related
to any health care decisions OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.12(A) (Baldwin Supp.
1989). There are also plans to modify the statute so that only directly related
personnel will be prevented from being named attorneys in fact. Sen. Pfeiffer,
supra note 18.
" Not a symbol of profession, but of relation to the principal, or the one who
executed a Durable Power of Attorney for health document.
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principal only when the principal becomes incompetent.'8 Such power
may be revoked at any time by the grantor because there is always a
presumption that the principal is competent. 85
The statute grants power to the attorney in fact to give informed consent
or informed refusal to medical treatments for the principal. 186 To this end,
the attorney in fact has the same right that the principal has to receive
medical information in order to make an informed decision. 18 7 In addition,
the principal can give some directives in advance of illness or injury 88
so that medical decisions will be made which are consistent with his
desires.189
There are advantages in permitting an attorney in fact to make deci-
sions generally made by a guardian for the incompetent. The primary
benefit is that an attorney in fact, unlike a guardian, does not need to
expend the time, money, and effort of court proceedings in order to become
effective as a decision-maker.' 90 An attorney in fact's powers vest im-
mediately upon a determination of the incompetency of the principal.'8 '
Although a determination of incompetency may need court adjudication
in some circumstances, once determined, there is no need to prolong court
time and money in selecting a suitable decision-maker when a durable
power of attorney document has been executed by the incompetent while
he was still competent.
Another advantage in executing a durable power of attorney document
is that a principal can specify the person to whom he wishes to entrust
the guardianship of his liberty rights. 92 This chance for advance selection
enables the principal to choose someone who would be most likely to
14 Oino REV. CODE § 1337.12(A)(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1989). As such, this is a
"springing" power that takes effect, not immediately, but at the instance of in-
competency. S. Smith, Alternate Decision Making for the Elderly: Durable, Spring-
ing and Health Care Powers of Attorney and Living Wills 9-11 (1990) (unpublished
manuscript); Kapp, supra note 49, at 548.
1I" Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.14 (Baldwin Supp. 1989). For an overview of
the DPAH, see Carlson, Ohio's New Law: Durable Power of Attorney for Health
Care Decisions, CLEVELAND PHYsIciAN (1989).
' OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.12(A)(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1989).
'
17Unless a restriction has been written onto the document form by the prin-
cipal. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.13(A)(3) (Baldwin Supp. 1989).
I"8OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.17 (Baldwin Supp. 1989) provides a form where
they can be written in.
189 Mandated by OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1337.13(A)(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1989)
which reads in pertinent part: "(Tihe attorney in fact shall act consistently with
the desires of the principal or, if the desires of the principal are unknown, shall
act in the best interests of the principal."
190 A guardian needs court approval for such legal capacity. Omo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2101.24(A)(4) (Baldwin 1987).
91 We will have to see to what extent, if any, such appointment can be chal-
lenged by others. However, a presumption would be in favor of the attorney in
fact since the court generally appoints someone it feels would preserve the best
interests of the incompetent. See discussion supra notes 61-68 & accompanying
text. Since the principal already designated this person, it is presumed he would
be looking after his own interests, or at least that his decision should be respected
barring a finding that the attorney in fact selected is inappropriate.
192 See Kapp, supra note 49, at 545.
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make the same informed decisions that he would make for himself if he
were able. Thus, in addition to saving the time, money, and effort required
in a court proceeding, there is greater certainty that the most suitable
decision-maker has been selected. It would n9 t be surprising if the at-
torney in fact turned out to be the same person that the court would have
chosen as guardian. Advance selection by the principal, however, creates
a presumption of the suitability of the attorney in fact that is strong
enough to dispense with the necessity of his approval by court.19
A final advantage provided by the DPAH is that documented directives
can be furnished by the principal in advance of their need.194 This ensures
greater certainty that the informed consent or refusal is consistent with
the decision of the principal in so far as he was able to foresee his own
condition and choice of treatments.
Under the DPAH statute, an attorney in fact has authority to make
health care decisions for the principal during the principal's incompe-
tency.195 He has the ability to substitute his judgment for the principal
in making decisions consistent with the principal's desires. 1 He must
follow advance directives except where they have been shown not to have
the effect that the principal wished. 19 7 The attorney in fact also has the
ability to consent to the disconnection of life support, including artificial
nutrition and hydration (or refuse to consent to its initiation) when the
principal is in a terminal condition.19 8
193 See supra note 3 & accompanying text.
19 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.17 (Baldwin Supp. 1989).
9OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.12(A)(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1989).
1 See supra note 189 & accompanying text.
197 Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1337.13(F)(1) & (2) (Baldwin Supp. 1989).
198 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.13(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1989) in pertinent part
states: "An attorney in fact.., does not have authority.., to refuse or withdraw
... health care that is necessary to maintain the life of the principal, unless the
principal is in a terminal condition."
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1337.13(E) (Baldwin Supp. 1989) reads, in pertinent
part: "An attorney in fact... does not have authority to refuse or withdraw ...
the provision of nutrition or hydration. .. unless... : (1)... [it] would not provide
comfort care ...; (2) ... either...: (a) ... death ... is imminent...; [or] (b) ...
[it] could not be assimilated or would shorten the life ...."
The attorney in fact's authority to terminate nutritional and hydrational life
support is emphasized in OIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1337.16(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1989)
which reads, in pertinent part:
No physician who ... refuses to comply with the instructions of an
attorney in fact ... to withhold or withdraw health care necessary to
keep the principal alive that were given under Division (A) of section
1337.13 of the Revised Code shall prevent ... the transfer ... to the
care of a physician who will comply with the instructions ....
Section 1337.13(A) stipulates that a valid power of attorney has been created
pursuant to section 1337.12, and that the circumstances when refusal or with-
drawal occur be limited, in part, by the stipulations above. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1337.13(A) (Baldwin Supp. 1989).
In stipulating that regardless of what the principal designates in the DPA
document "... the attorney in fact NEVER will be authorized to..." disconnect
life support unless death is "imminent" even with it; or to refuse or disconnect
artificial nutrition or hydration unless death is imminent, the statute is really
granting the attorny in fact the power to disconnect life support, even nutrition
1990]
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There are, however, limitations on an attorney in fact. He cannot ex-
ercise his substitute judgment in refusing (or withdrawing) consent to
artificial nutrition or hydration unless certain criteria are met.19 Ter-
mination of nutrition or hydration by the principal's attorney in fact are
permitted only when: (1) death is imminent regardless of medical care;
(2) when nutrition or hydration would harm the patient or would not help
him survive; and (3) nutrition and hydration would not provide comfort. 20 0
In fact, the attorney in fact may not refuse or withdraw consent to any
life support unless the principal's death is imminent.20 1 The statute also
refuses to allow the withdrawal of comfort care20 2 or to refuse or to dis-
connect life support in most cases where the principal is pregnant.20 3
These limitations on the power of the attorney in fact in matters of
informed refusal or withdrawal of any artificial life support (not just
artificial nutrition and hydration) are consistent with the common law
policy requiring court supervision when life support systems are to be
removed from an incompetent whose death is not imminent.2 ° Under the
common law, state interests must be weighed against a person's right of
self-determination before a decision to disconnect life-sustaining ma-
and hydration, under the circumstances of imminent death. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 1337.13 (Baldwin Supp. 1989). Implicitely, the attorney in fact does have the
authority to do so when the principal is in a statutorily defined terminal condition.
I" See supra note 198. There are circumstances when providing food and water
is nearly impossible. In severely burned victims, for instance, the insertion of an
IV may be difficult and create a higher risk of infection. Nasogastric tubing may
increase pain, and insertion of a gastrostomy apparatus may be impossible be-
cause there is not enough skin to hold it in place. Lynn and Childress, supra note
108, at 51.
Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.13 (Baldwin Supp. 1989) and supra note 10.
o Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.13(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1989), and supra note
198.202 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.13(C) (Baldwin Supp. 1989). But nutrition and
hydration is not always required to provide comfort. Some may die more com-
fortably when fluids are not forced. Lynn and Childress, supra note 108, at 59(1986). In addition, using artificial tubings or surgical implantations can cause
pain, infection, or other complications. Note, Artificial Nutrition and the Ter-
minally Ill: How Should Washington Decide?, 61 WASH. L. REV. 419, 425 (1986).
Comfort may be provided by moistening parched lips, but this is far short of what
is necessary to keep the person alive. Childress, supra note 108, at 73.
203 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.13(D) (Baldwin Supp. 1989).
2' There is one suggestion that a court does not actually exercise its supervisory
powers unless all interested parties do not agree to the termination of life support
of the incompetent. See Carlson, Ohio's New Law: Durable Power of Attorney for
Health Care Decisions, CLEVELAND PHYsIcIAN 6 (December 1989). This might
explain why many cases never reach the courts. See e.g., Childress, supra note
108, at 67-68. Under this rationale, consensus is important, and without it, the
court must intervene to protect the incompetent's wishes. Giving legal power to
an attorney in fact to disconnect the life support of the incompetent would bypass
the consensus safeguard. Therefore, even under this rationale, an attorney in fact
could not be granted the ability to make a unilateral decision which would ul-
timately result in the death of an incompetent whose death was not imminent.
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chines can be supported. 20 5 In cases where death is imminent, the state's
interest in the preservation of life is minimal. Therefore, a decision to
terminate life support in those cases does not conflict with any compelling
state interests and can be effectuated without court supervision. In cases
where a patient may be terminal but where death is not imminent, the
only way in which the state can preserve its interests in the preservation
of life, prevention of suicide, protection of third parties, and safeguarding
the integrity of the medical community is by examining each case in court
where the termination of life support becomes an issue. 20 6 Without the
appropriate safeguards of court supervision, an attorney in fact could
abuse his powers.20 7 Therefore, the court still needs to examine whether
the substituted judgment is supported by clear and convincing evidence
of the incompetent's intent as set forth in Leach.20 Cruzan2°9 concurs in
the necessity of safeguarding the wishes of the incompetent through
standard-setting.210 The Court held that a clear and convincing eviden-
tiary standard, such as the one mandated by Leach in Ohio, is constitu-
tional when used to decide whether to terminate nutrition/hydration
devices from a once-competent incompetent person who is in a state of
persistent vegetation.
211
205 See supra Section II.C.3. on State Interests.
2-0 Because of the necessity of court intervention to terminate but not neces-
sarily to begin life support in the first place, it is easier simply to avoid the legal
and emotional conflicts by never beginning treatment. Courts are reluctant to
impose liability on inaction. Byrn, Compulsory Lifesaving Treatment for the Com-
petent Adult, 44 FoRDHA" L. REv. 1, 9 (1975). Some feel that withdrawing treat-
ment is worse than not beginning. Lynn and Childress, supra note 108, at 55.
But such inaction is really worse because it is necessary to begin aggressive
treatment to save those who might otherwise recover. One cannot assess a prog-
nosis without initial intervention under the doctrine of implied consent. THE
HASTINGS CENTER, GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREAT-
MENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING 130 (1987). If the courts make termination
more difficult, this unfortunate result may occur which would go against the
court's intent.
207 For instance, the attorney in fact might be influenced by some personal
benefit in deciding one way or another. He might not properly interpret the
directives. The document might be outdated, forged, or represented by someone
other than the person who claims to be the attorney in fact.
208 Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1,426 N.E.2d 809 (1980).
The DPAH document clearly states that an attorney in fact would never be able
to terminate life support in statutorily-defined non-terminal conditions. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1337.17 (Baldwin Supp. 1989). It also clearly states that advance
directives may be issued: "You may express your desires ... by including them
in this document or by making them known to him in another manner." OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 1337.17 (Baldwin Supp. 1989). By inference, although directives
which ask that life support be terminated or refused in situations of irreversible
persistent vegetative state could not be carried out by the attorney in fact, there
is no reason why they could not be used by the court as evidence of the principal's
intent. The court did not limit the principal in making such directives; it only
limited the ability of the attorney in fact to implement them without court in-
tervention. The court could then make a case by case determination of whether
such evidence was clear and convicing and whether it was compelling enough to
outweigh the state's interests pursuant to Leach.
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Health Dept., 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
210 Id. at 2852. See supra notes 134-38 & accompanying text.
211 Id.
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The DPAH indirectly supports the view of court adjudication in situ-
ations of non-imminent death because it directs that any rights granted
by the statute are separate from any rights the attorney in fact might
otherwise have.212 His guardianship authority under the common law,
apart from the statute, remains intact.213 Thus, guardians have the ability
to handle situations involving life-sustaining machinery in situations
other than the ones outlined in the statute. 214 While an attorney in fact
may not enforce a decision to disconnect the life support from the incom-
petent, as guardian he may still plead, and win, such termination from
the overseeing court. Senator Richard Pfeiffer, sponsor of Senate Bill 13
before its enactment into the Durable Power of Attorney for Health,
confirms this interpretation.2 5 The DPAH gave the maximum authority
possible to attorneys in fact while preserving the integrity of the common
law.
Thus, the policy behind the limitation of the attorney in fact's powers
is to preserve the court's ability to protect the incompetent's rights and
to balance them with state interests.216 Such limitations are unnecessary
to impose on a guardian because legally, a guardian is already bound by
the court's supervisory powers in matters regarding the disconnection of
life support from an incompetent who is not terminally ill.217
The DPAH does not change the common law procedures which can be
used by a guardian. The statute clearly stipulates that a guardian pre-
serves whatever rights and powers he had under the common law in these
matters apart from the statutory authority he may have in addition as
attorney in fact.21 8
C. Couture v. Couture: A Misinterpretation of the Statute
Through 1988, there were no Ohio cases determining whether or not
an incompetent who was once competent could choose to refuse or ter-
212 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.13(A)(2) (Baldwin Supp. 1989) reads in per-
tinent part: 'This section does not affect... any right that the person designated
as attorney in fact ... may have, apart from the instrument, to make or participate
in the making of health care decisions on behalf of the principal." It would have
been more clear if the wording had simply stated that a guardian's powers re-
mained unchanged and were separate from whatever powers that same person
may have had as attorney in fact.21
3 1d. § 1337.13(A)(2).
214 Sen. Pfeiffer, supra note 18.
Z
15 Id.
216 It is not, as the Couture court suggests, a policy to prevent any disconnection
of nutrition or dehydration. See infra notes 255-56 & accompanying text.
217 See Leach v. Shapiro, 13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (1984). One
author suggests that without court supervision, there is a danger that decisions
will be made not in the best interests of the incompetent, but in the best interests
of the physicians, hospital, family, or society. Solnick, Withdrawal and With-
holding of Life-Support in Terminally Ill Patients. Part II, 4 MEDICINE AND LAW
1, 7-8 (1985).2180mo REv. CODE ANN. § 1337.13(A)(2) (Baldwin Supp. 1989); See also Sen.
Pfeiffer, supra note 18.
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minate artificial nutrition and hydration life support systems. The de-
velopment of the common law in Ohio can be attributed to the decisions
in Leach219 and Shapiro220 which held that respirators could be discon-
nected from terminally ill incompetent persons who, by clear and con-
vincing evidence, could be ascertained to have made a choice for their
future medical care while they were competent to do S0.221 These cases
relied on the privacy rights expressed in Quinlan222 and the doctrine of
informed consent utilized in Eichner223 to allow third parties to use their
substituted judgement on behalf of the incompetent in order to preserve
his rights.224 Since Leach, other jurisdictions have applied these same
principles of self-determination and personal autonomy to the refusal or
with-drawal of artificial nutrition and hydration. California,225 Dela-
ware, 221 Massachusetts, 2 7 and New Jersey 228 cases have permitted refusal
or with- drawal of artificial nutrition and hydration. Last year Ohio had a
chance to decide whether it would follow the lead of these states.
Early in 1989, Daniel Couture became comatose and is now in a per-
sistent vegetative state with virtually no chance for recovery.229 He is
unable to sense pain. No longer on a respirator, he retains a feeding tube
for nutrition and hydration, but he is expected to die in a matter of months
due to the collection of fluid on his brain.230 His mother, family members,
his physician and hospital, the American Medical Association, the Amer-
ican Academy of Neurology, and his guardian-ad-litem all agreed that
termination of the feeding tube was in his best interest, and that he would
desire such withdrawal.2 31 Couture had, on several occasions, declared
219 Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1,426 N.E.2d 809 (1980).
220 Shapiro, 13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (1984).
2 2
1 Leach, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980); Shapiro, 13 Ohio App. 3d
393, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (1984).22 2 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
In re Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980).
224 Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); Eicher, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426
N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980).
21 See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297
(1986) (where hospital could not force feeding tubes on a competent adult); Barber
v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983) (where phy-
sicians who withdrew IV tubing from a brain-damaged patient were held not
liable).
22 See Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 425 A.2d 156 (Del. Ch. 1980)
(where court permitted withdrawal of nasogastric tubing from comatose auto
accident victim).
27 See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp. 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626
(1986) (where the substituted judgment of a persistently vegetative patient was
permitted in removing a gastrostomy tube); In re Hier, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 200,
464 N.E.2d 959 (1984) (where the Appeals Court did not force invasive surgical
implantation of a gastrostomy tube).
In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985) (where patient who died
before finalization of case would not have been forced to accept nasogastric tubing
and its resultant pain).
2 Couture v. Couture, 48 Ohio App.3d 208, 549 N.E.2d 571 (1989).
-° Id. at 210-11, 549 N.E.2d at 573.
1 Id. at 211-12, 549 N.E.2d at 574.
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that he did not want to prolong his life by artificial systems. These state-
ments were made with the realization that there was a risk that his
medication might cause him to become incompetent and fall into a per-
sistent vegetative state. Unfortunately, the risk did materialize and re-
sulted in Couture's present irreversible vegetative state.2 32 In spite of
these facts, which the Couture court conceded were "adequate to support
the substituted judgment of the guardian,' 23 3 the court held that his
guardian was unable to consent to the removal of nutrition and hydration
tubes. The court reasoned that any other decision would be contrary to
the public policy as outlined in the DPAH 23 4 since the "General Assembly[]
is opposed to the withdrawal of nutrition or hydration under these cir-
cumstances [non-imminence of death] notwithstanding the wishes of the
patient or his surrogate.'23 5
Such an interpretation of the DPAH is highly questionable in light of
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Cruzan.236 Contrary to Couture, Cruzan
does not dispute a person's right to make an informed choice regarding
the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration. Rather, it finds difficulty with
how an incompetent person's wishes could be ascertained with the degree
of certainty necessary for a surrogate decision-maker to exercise those
rights.23 7 Cruzan encourages states to set their own standards and accepts
the clear and convincing standard used in Missouri and Ohio (for deter-
mining whether other life support mechanisms could be refused or with-
drawn) as appropriate for making decisions regarding nutrition and
hydration.2 1
The Couture court's rationale is also highly questionable in light of the
language and legislative intent of the DPAH statute. Couture misapplies
the DPAH to guardians, misapplies the statutory definition of "terminal,"
and implies an erroneous distinction between nutrition/hydration and
other life support methods.
232 Id. at 209, 213-14, 549 N.E.2d at 572-73, 576.
- Id. at 214, 549 N.E.2d at 576.
23Id. This decision came out a month before the statute was in effect. Therefore,
there was no such thing under Ohio law as an attorney in fact for health matters.
It may also be interesting to note that Couture did not refer to the newly enacted
guardianship statute in OHio REv. CODE § 2111.13(D) (Baldwin 1989) which
specifically grants guardians the power to make health care decisions for theincompetent. Carlson, Ohio's New Law: Durable Power of Attorney For Health
Care Decisions, CLEvELAND PHYsIcIAN 6 (December 1989).
23 Couture, 48 Ohio App.3d at 213, 549 N.E.2d at 576.
23 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
"
7 Id. at 2852. See supra notes 50-54, notes 110-11, and notes 136-38 & accom-
panying text.
21S Id. at 2856. There is an argument that the family is the best decisionmaker.
Note, Privacy, Family, and Medical Decision Making for Persistent Vegetative
Patients, 11 CARDozo L. REV. 713 (1990). Another author believes that a "best
interests" standard is preferable since no one can ever really give a clear expres-
sion of what he will believe is the right decision at the moment it must be made.
Thus, the decision should be made by those persons closest to the incompetent at
the time it is needed. Moreover, court adjudication, he believes, should be utilized
only when no suitable decisionmaker is available. Schultz, Procedures and Lim-
itations for Removal of Life-Sustaining Treatment from Incompetent Patients, 34
ST. Louis U. L. J. 277, 300-305 (1990). These viewpoints, however, do not takeinto account the increased risk of abuse without court supervision.
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1. Misapplication of the DPAH to guardians. The statute does not in
any way indicate a drift away from what was accepted under the common
law concerning the disconnection of life support. On the contrary, the
DPAH expressly provides for the maintenance of guardianship powers
when it states that:
This section does not affect, and shall not be construed as af-
fecting any right that the person designated as attorney in fact
in a durable power of attorney for health care may have, apart
from the instrument, to make or participate in the making of
health care decisions on behalf of the principal.23 9
Further, when the DPAH is read in conjunction with the new Ohio guard-
ianship statute that specifically recognizes the powers of a guardian to
make health care decisions for an incompetent it is clear that the DPAH
was not envisioned by the legislature as superceding a guardian's common
law powers.20 In addition, other jurisdictions, unlike the Couture court,
have interpreted statutory limitations as not applying to guardian rights
and powers.
2 4
'
2. Misapplication of the statutory definition of "terminal condition" to
guardians. In the DPAH, "'[t]erminal condition' means any illness or
injury that is likely to result in imminent death, regardless of the type,
nature, and amount of health care that is provided. '242 This definition is
different from the one utilized by the Leach court in its interpretation of
Ohio common law.243 Mrs. Leach's condition was regarded as terminal
when her prognosis for death was within three to five years. The Leach
court accepted the medical usage of the word "terminal." Subsequently,
her respirator was ordered disconnected by the court after they had de-
termined (through the substitute judgment of her guardian and family)
that it would be her wish to do so.2 "
If the Couture court had used the Leach definition of terminal condition,
the medical determination that Daniel Couture would die within months
would permit the disconnection of life support.245 The Couture court, how-
ever, chose to abandon the common law adjudication and use the statutory
definition of terminal instead, to prevent Couture's guardian from carry-
ing out Couture's clearly expressed wishes. Since Couture's death was
not "imminent" by statutory definition, he was unable to have the feeding
n9 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.13(A)(2) (Baldwin Supp. 1989). Sen. Pfeifler,
supra note 18, also states that the statute was not meant to supercede guardian
powers. See also Kapp, supra note 49, at 549.
240 OHIo REV. CODE § 2111.01(A) (Baldwin 1989).
21 E.g., McConnell v. Beverly Enterprises-Connecticut, Inc., 209 Conn. 692,
553 A.2d 596 (1989); Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So.2d 368 (Fla. App. 1986);
King, Roberts, Jefferson & Brody, Where Death Begins While Life Continues, 31
S. TEx. L. REV. 145, 184 (1990).
142 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.11(I) (Baldwin Supp. 1989).
'4 Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1,426 N.E.2d 809 (1980).
2" Id.
m Sen. Pfeiffer, supra note 18.
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tubes disconnected.2 46 What the Couture court did not seem to understand
was that "terminal condition" needed to be narrowly drawn in the DPAH
statute in order to grant the attorney in fact powers that did not nullify
the court's protection of the incompetent's autonomy and its own state
interests.24 7 Nowhere in the text of the statute does it indicate that this
narrow definition of terminal condition is to be imposed on the common
law powers granted to a guardian. Contrary to the Couture court's finding,
the statute specifically provided that the statute did not change any pow-
ers that the attorney in fact had as a common law guardian.248
3. Nutrition/hydration distinction. The Couture court opined that the
DPAH had defined "best interests" of the incompetent, as a matter of law,
to preclude consent to withdraw means of artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion, in spite of the incompetent's clear desires to avoid such intrusion
on his body. 249 The statutory provision regarding an ability to terminate
life support, however, was not limited to nutrition and hydration. It is
clear from the statute that all life support mechanisms fall under the
same limitations.25 0 The particular specifications regarding artificial nu-
trition and hydration serve to clarify the point at which artificial nutrition
and hydration could be disconnected without court supervision. Thus, the
policy in the statute does not proscribe the termination of nutrition and
hydration per se as the Couture court suggests. Instead, it recognizes that
it is in the best interest of the individual to have the final decision open
to court supervision.
As a case of first impression, the narrow holding in Couture to refuse
permission to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration from any in-
competent could have been acceptable. There is evidence that some judges
are unhappy with their colleagues' majority decision to permit such a
withdrawal.2 5 1 In addition, there is some controversy among philosophers
as to whether artificial nutrition and hydration should be distinguished
from other life support mechanisms. 52 However, the Couture court's broad
26 Couture v. Couture, 48 Ohio App. 3d 208,213,549 N.E.2d 571,575-76 (1989).
27See supra notes 85-155, 244 & accompanying text.
248 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.13(A)(2) (Baldwin 1989).
? Couture, at 213, 549 N.E.2d at - (1989).
20 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.13(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1989) reads: "An attorney
in fact under a durable power of attorney for health care does not have authority,
on behalf of the principal, to refuse or withdraw informed consent to health care
that is necessary to maintain the life of the principal, unless the principal is in
a terminal condition"; Sen. Pfeiffer, supra note 18.
251 Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986)
(Nolan, J. & Lynch, J., dissenting).
252 Some argue that food and water are symbols of care and compassion and,
therefore, can never be withheld. On the other hand, means of artificially feeding
and providing moisture are really more similar to other medical procedures than
to eating and drinking. Other life-support withdrawals such as discontinuation
of dialysis or transfusions have similar effects to malnutrition or dehydration.
Lynn and Childress, supra note 108, at 57-58. Even the states of malnutrition or
dehydration are determined chemically; they are not synonymous with the hunger
and thirst that we abhor. The Hastings Center, GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION
OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING 59-60 (1987). See
also supra notes 141, 182.
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decision to prevent disconnection of artificial nutrition and hydration
based on statutory policy as outlined in the DPAH is erroneous because
it failed to understand the reason for the narrow definition of "terminal"
adopted by the statute, the nutrition/hydration distinction, and both of
these as relating to guardians.
25 3
D. Setting Ohio on Course
The decision in Couture,26 while misinterpreting and misapplying the
DPAH statute, now stands as a possible precedent for future Ohio case
law. The statute was not intended to change, but to complement, the
common-law power of guardians. Nor was it designed to foist a narrow,
statutory definition of "terminal" on the courts. The statute intended that
guardians and courts be free to accept the medical determination of "ter-
minal" adopted by the Ohio courts in Leach.255 The Ohio legislature must
now take appropriate action to clarify its position in light of the Couture
decision.2 56 Until it does, Ohio courts will be left straddling the line be-
tween accepting the holding in Couture, or ignoring Couture and taking
the proper stand on the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration based on
sound reasoning and a valid interpretation of the DPAH statute.
The legislature could clarify the DPAH by expressly stating that guard-
ians can still make decisions regarding the removal of life support, in-
cluding nutrition and hydration, from an incompetent. In addition, the
legislature must clarify the use of advance directives concerning the with-
drawal of life support. Although an attorney in fact may not terminate
life support pursuant to the incompetent's advance directives within the
DPAH, the directives could be used as evidence of the incompetent's
intent. Therefore, even though the attorney in fact was unable to execute
the principal's request of life support termination himself, under the
supervision of the courts he, or another who would be appointed as the
principal's guardian, could effectuate the principal's medical choice to
terminate life support. Ideally, the directives would satisfy the require-
ments of informed consent as espoused by the court in Shapiro.25 7
An alternative course of legislative action would include legislative
approval of a "living will" document enabling a person to express his
intent prior to becoming incompetent. Other jurisdictions have such "liv-
253 Sen. Pfeiffer, supra note 18.
Couture v. Courture, 48 Ohio App. 3d 208, 549 N.E.2d 571 (1989).
255 Sen. Pfeiffer, supra note 18.
256 Id.
17 Leach v. Shapiro, 13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 397, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1053 (where
the doctrine of informed consent permitted that "[gleneral statements by the
patient could still be considered by a court, of course, in determining the wishes
of a patient in a chronic vegetative condition." Id.). See supra notes 32-46 &
accompanying text. The DPAH document provides a form enabling advance di-
rectives to be made by the principal. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.17 (Baldwin
Supp. 1989). See also F. ROUSE, THE PHYSICIAN AND THE HOPELESSLY ILL PATIENT
7 (1985).
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ing will" documents. 25 Some states expressly approve of a principal's
ability to make advance directives for the termination of all life support
systems, including artificial nutrition and hydration, in the living will
document.259 Dicta in Cruzan supports written documentation as the best
means of expressing intent.260 In this manner, the principal could exercise
his autonomy rights and advance directives for the consent to, refusal of,
or termination of artificial life support systems. 261
If the Ohio legislature does not choose to enact "living will"
legislation262 or to clarify the DPAH statute for the courts, then Ohio is
faced with the risk of continued misinterpretation of the DPAH statute,
which threatens the right of its citizens to choose death with dignity.
Although there is always the possibility that a future case may arise
which would provide Ohio courts with the opportunity of properly inter-
preting the DPAH statute regarding the withdrawal or refusal of nutri-
tion and hydration in a once-competent incompetent who is in a persistent
vegetative state, there are also grave dangers in this approach. A later
case may claim stare decisis and, like Couture, refuse to consider the true
issues while following the holding of Couture. Another danger is that
physicians, fearful of lawsuits, may make medical decisions they believe
are not in the best interests of their patients.2 63 Thus, legislative action
is needed to eradicate any possible effects of the flawed Couture decision
and assure that future Ohio cases are decided in accord with the true
meaning and purpose of the DPAH statute.
IV. CONCLUSION
The development of aggressive medical life saving and life-sustaining
technology has led to the necessity for a coherent and humane policy
dictating when they may be refused or withdrawn. The common law in
Ohio has established that a competent person may refuse or withdraw
"I0 "Living wills" are legislatively-approved documents whereby a person can
document their desire not to be maintained on life support systems should they
become terminally ill and incompetent. Note, Comparison of the Living Will Stat-
utes of the Fifty States, 14 J. OF CONTEMP. LAW 105 (1988).
259 Id. at 121-29. Ohio has no living will statute. Id. at 127. For a contrary view
that living wills should not be used, see Mayo, Constitutionalizing the "Right to
Die," 49 MD. L. REV. 103, 145 (1990)(An executor might feel obliged to discontinue
life support even though he does not want to.).
260 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2856 (1990); "These
procedures for surrogate decisionmaking [living will and durable power of attor-
ney statutes], which appear to be rapidly gaining acceptance, may be a valuable
additional safeguard of the patient's interest in directing his medical care." Id.
at 2858 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
2'1 F. ROUSE, THE PHYSICIAN AND THE HOPELESSLY ILL PATIENT 29 (1985).
262 Although there is a proposal in the House now, it seems unlikely to pass
without outside incentive. Such legislation has been introduced and failed several
times. Sen. Pfeiffer, supra note 18.
262 Kapp, supra note 49.
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life support. If, however, the person is incompetent, life support may be
withdrawn when clear and convincing evidence validates the substituted
decision by the guardian of the incompetent to discontinue life support
measures. Before ordering a termination of the life support of an incom-
petent, the court must weigh the rights of the individual that would be
invaded by life support maintenance against conflicting state interests.
If the incompetent's rights outweigh the state's interest in preserving
life, preventing suicide, preserving the integrity of the medical profession,
and protecting innocent third parties, then disconnection is ordered.
Several jurisdictions have included the artificial means of nutrition and
hydration within the definition of life support. Ohio has not formulated
a coherent policy. On the one hand, Couture has proscribed the termi-
nation of nutrition and hydration from an incompetent in a persistent
vegetative state. On the other hand, the Couture court based its decision
on an erroneous interpretation of Ohio's new Durable Power of Attorney
for Health statute.
The DPAH, contrary to Couture's explanation, preserved the supervi-
sory responsibility of the court in deciding whether or not to forego all
life support (not just nutrition/hydration) whenever death was not im-
minent. The statute did not change the authority of a guardian to decide
treatment for an incompetent. Instead, the statute gave the maximum
power possible to the attorney in fact to make decisions for the principal.
The attorney in fact could even effectuate, without court supervision, a
refusal or withdrawal of nutrition and hydration maintenance within the
statute when physicians determined that such life support would not be
helpful, would not provide comfort, and when death was imminent.
Couture caused confusion in Ohio's determination of whether to permit
a once-competent incompetent individual to direct his future decisions
regarding nutrition and hydration. If Ohio wishes to treat nutrition and
hydration life support in a different manner than other life support meas-
ures, it should do so for sound medical, moral, and legal reasons; not for
false or arbitrary ones.
Ohio has yet to adopt a policy regarding the refusal or withdrawal of
nutrition and hydration. New legislation or new cases can help if they
resolve the key issues: Should Ohio accept the proposal that artificial
nutrition and hydration is indistinguishable from other life-sustaining
systems and follow the lead of many states that permit their termination?
Or, should the repugnance of the physical deterioration of a malnourished,
dehydrated human being2 6 be so strong that deprivation of food and water
in all cases must be forbidden?
JUNE MARY ZEKAN MAKDISI
6 Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 442,444 n.2, 497 N.E.2d
626, 640, 641 n.2 (1986) (Nolan, J. & Lynch, J. dissenting).
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